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IMPACT OF SOCIAL IDENTITY ON RAPE LEGITIMACY AND MYTH ACCEPTANCE 
 
RACHAEL C. ROSENBERG 
(Under the Direction of Amy A. Hackney) 
ABSTRACT 
 
The current research assessed whether a statement by a deviant political ingroup (versus 
outgroup) member elicited measureable differences on trivialization, cognitive dissonance, rape 
myth acceptance, or decision to vote for that candidate, and if explicitly “debunking” the 
statement made by this politician further impacted these variables.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to read a statement made by a Republican or Democratic politician, who would either 
be an ingroup or outgroup member based on the party affiliation of each participant.  Results 
indicate that while there were no significant differences between Republican or Democratic 
participants overall, Republicans tended to trivialize the statements made by their ingroup 
politician more than Democrats.  Contrary to the hypotheses, participants experienced similar 
levels of dissonance across voting decision after reading about a deviant ingroup member.  
However, consistent with theory, there was significantly lower dissonance among those who read 
about an outgroup politician and voted for an ingroup politician.  While failing to reach statistical 
significance, a trend towards increased rape myth acceptance among participants who read about 
a deviant ingroup politician and then voted for them was revealed, and this was fully mediated 
by level of trivialization.Implications for social identity and cognitive dissonance theories are 
discussed.   
INDEX WORDS:  social identity theory, cognitive dissonance, rape myth acceptance, political 
identification 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  
Much psychological and political research is dedicated to understanding the basis of, and 
transmission of political preferences across generations (i.e., Verhulst, Hatemi, & Eaves, 2012; 
Hatemi, Funk, Medland, Maes, Silberg, Martin, & Eaves, 2009).  Ongoing research in this area 
indicates that the genesis and development of political attitudes cannot be singularly attributed to 
one.  Rather, attitudes are comprised of stable behavioral patterns which are then shaped by the 
social environment and form the basis of target specific attitudes (i.e., Verhulst, Hatemi, Eaves, 
2012; Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alrod, Hibbing, 2011).  Once these attitudes are formed we seek to 
maintain them by avoiding, distorting, or disregarding information which could contradict them, 
and thereby arouse dissonance (Sweeney, Melnyk, Miller, & Shepperd, 2010).  Researchers refer 
to this as a defense motivation, as it is intended to prevent discomfort caused by information 
which may threaten one’s beliefs or the self (Hart, et al., 2009).  
However, there are times when we may be unable to avoid information or become aware 
of events which are inconsistent with our individual ideologies, which force us to reconcile 
ideals with reality.  Comments made by several American politicians in the last year provide a 
timely example of the tendency to avoid or disregard, attitude discrepant information.  For 
example, Senator Todd Akins (R-Missouri) and Representative Trent Franks (R-Arizona) have 
each made controversial remarks regarding rape, pregnancy, and abortion, the latter of which is a 
wedge issue in American politics.  According to Akins, legitimate rape does not result in 
pregnancy due to innate mechanisms in the female body which “shut that whole thing down” 
(Ashley, Liptak, & Streitfeld, 2012).  This belief was echoed by Franks when he stated that 
“incidents of rape resulting in pregnancy are very low” (Killough & Walsh, 2013).  Senator 
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Saxton Chambliss (R-Georgia) used a similar script to make light of sexual assault in the military 
by blaming it on hormones (Ford, 2013).   
Despite the overwhelming majority of the medical community rejecting the assertion that 
trauma from rape can prevent pregnancy (i.e., American Congress of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 2012), this belief has been perpetuated by a variety of pro-life supporters (e.g., 
Rep. Henry Aldrige, Rep. Stephen Friend, etc.; Townsend, 2012).  Beyond activists with clear 
motivations for propagating these beliefs, a group of conservative women lent support to Akins 
and his statements while simultaneously acknowledging them as medically inaccurate (McVeigh, 
2012).  Psychological mechanisms such as social identity and cognitive dissonance could explain 
ongoing electoral support for Akins, and politicians like him, despite the loss of party support 
from Republican leadership.   
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
 The purpose of this present research is to determine which psychological processes could 
contribute to ongoing support for a deviant political ingroup member.  Particularly, is cognitive 
dissonance aroused, and if so, which route to dissonance reduction do participants take?  Will 
they trivialize the behavior, reject the ingroup politician, or adjust their attitudes to match those 
of the ingroup politician?  The current research assessed whether a statement by a deviant 
political ingroup (versus outgroup) member elicited measureable differences on trivialization, 
cognitive dissonance, or rape myth acceptance, or decision to vote for that candidate, and if 
explicitly “debunking” the statement made by this politician further impacted these variables.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF THE PAST LITERATURE 
 
 
Social Identity Theory 
Given the large role that socialization plays in the development of political ideology, it is 
important to understand the dynamics of social identity.  Social categorizations of ingroup and 
outgroup membership allows individuals to organize their social environment and their role 
within it.  According to social identity theory (SIT), an individuals’ self-image is defined in part 
by the characteristics of a particular social group (i.e., Republicans or Democrats), as well as 
their role within that group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  For example, someone who is a staunch 
member of the Democratic party, their ingroup, is likely to think of themselves in similar 
ideological terms as their political party (e.g., progressive, open-minded, etc.).  SIT also posits 
that people gain self-esteem by positive assessments of their social group, and that their positive 
in-group evaluations are relative to their assessments of the outgroup, thus motivating them to 
assign negative judgments to the outgroup (Tajfel, 1982).   Therefore, a member of the 
Democratic Party is likely to think of a Republican, their political outgroup, in negative terms 
(e.g. close-minded, anti-intellectual).  Derogation of outgroup members has been repeatedly 
demonstrated in the literature and is consistent with our need to enhance our ingroup in order to 
maintain self-esteem (e.g., Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada,1998; Branscombe & 
Wann, 1994).   
However, deviant ingroup behavior can threaten our positive ingroup identity, resulting 
in either further ingroup enhancement or the decision to leave the ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979).  Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens (1988) identified another means by which ingroup 
members maintain their positive self-concept in the face of negative ingroup behavior, and 
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labeled it the “black sheep effect.”  This extension to SIT revealed that judgments of deviant 
ingroup members with negative behaviors were more extreme than judgments of outgroup 
members engaging in identical behaviors.  They also found that the derogation of deviant 
ingroup members could result in such extreme consequences as that ingroup member being 
ostracized (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988).  By derogating or ostracizing a deviant ingroup member, 
the other group members are able to maintain their positive group identity, allowing group 
members to remain loyal to the ingroup.  For example, if a Christian family who is very religious 
and socially conservative discovers that their son or daughter is a homosexual, they are likely to 
ostracize that son or daughter because their identification as a homosexual threatens their 
conception of themselves as religious conservatives.   
Likelihood of ingroup member derogation is mediated by perceived level of group 
cohesion, with ingroup members derogating the “black sheep” only when perceived cohesion 
and deviant behavior was high (Lewis & Sherman, 2010).  In other words, the more cohesive 
group members perceive the group to be, the more likely it is that a deviant group member will 
be ostracized.  This outcome is positively correlated with the level of deviance, such that the 
more cohesive the group and more deviant the behavior, the greater the likelihood that the “black 
sheep” will be ostracized.  However, although Lewis and Sherman’s (2010) findings were 
statistically significant, the effect was only moderate in size, leading them to conclude that the 
potentially high costs of denigrating the deviant ingroup member means that there must be a 
tangible and substantial threat to the self before individuals would denigrate that member. 
Simply put, an ingroup member has to exhibit behavior which is extremely deviant before the 
black sheep effect would occur.  Therefore, there are likely situations in which individuals 
perceive an ingroup member’s behaviors as deviant, but it may not be sufficiently deviant to 
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warrant action from the group.  However, the lack of group action to address the deviance may 
have other consequences, such as dissonance arousal.   
 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
 
The intragroup conflict described previously can result in cognitive dissonance if the 
ingroup, whether an individual or the group as a whole, violates one’s personal beliefs (Glasford, 
Pratto & Dovidio, 2008).  Cognitive dissonance theory (CDT; Festinger, 1957) posits that when 
individuals become aware of two conflicting attitudes or beliefs, they will experience dissonance, 
or psychological discomfort which is aroused when we become aware of competing thoughts, 
attitudes, or behaviors.  For example, a person who believes they are a law-abiding citizen who 
finds they are driving over the speed-limit on the highway will experience cognitive dissonance.  
The two cognitions, that they are law-abiding and are breaking the law, are at odds with one 
another and must be addressed in order to reduce cognitive dissonance.  Aronson (1997) 
extended CDT theory by adding that dissonance is strongest when the competing cognitions 
threaten an individuals’ self-concept (i.e., believing oneself to competent or fair) or their self-
esteem.  That is, people are motivated to see themselves as competent and moral; and dissonance 
will occur if they engage in behaviors which contradict these beliefs.  Therefore, when 
Republicans were faced with a party member who expressed a deviant opinion regarding rape 
and conception, they experienced dissonance (i.e., McVeigh, 2012).   
As demonstrated in media reports (i.e., McVeigh, 2012; Ford, 2013), most Republicans, 
party leaders and members alike, publicly denounced Akins. However, as previously noted, a 
minority of individuals continued to support Akins and even acknowledged an increase in their 
support for him.  The factors which determine whether, and how, ingroup members will seek to 
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reduce dissonance caused by another ingroup member’s violation of group standards vary 
depending on the issue and strength of ingroup members endorsement of the beliefs which were 
violated. Research indicates that these group members may disidentify from the group or adjust 
their attitude strength on a particular issue in an effort to reduce the dissonance (Glasford, Pratto 
& Dovidio, 2008; Glasford, Dovidio & Pratto, 2009).   
In a series of experiments, Glasford et al. (2009) examined the effect of group 
identification on different methods of dissonance reduction. In Experiment 1 participants’ level 
of group identification moderated the ability of group affirmation (opportunity to re-focus on 
positive group characteristics) to reduce the dissonance caused by intragroup deviance. While 
both the self-affirmation (focus on positive self characteristics) and group-affirmation conditions 
resulted in lower dissonance amongst participants, those who were highly identified with the 
group experienced greater dissonance reduction in the group affirmation condition.  As noted by 
the authors, affirmation can reduce dissonance by increasing a sense of integrity; therefore, the 
affirmation task in their study allowed participants to refocus on the positive values associated 
with the ingroup and thereby reduce dissonance.  Their results support this assumption, with 
group affirmation resulting in reduced dissonance, especially among participants who highly 
identified with the ingroup.  In a second experiment, Glasford et al. (2009) manipulated level of 
group identification and found that in the high-identification condition, participants were more 
likely to engage in social identity enhancement, such as out-group derogation, when dissonance 
was present than to try and change ingroup behavior.  In plain terms, ingroup members have a 
choice to attempt to change the group norm (and risk ostracizing themselves), relinquish their 
group membership due to the violation of their values, or adjust their beliefs to accommodate a 
deviant ingroup member.  Likewise, in response to the statements of Akin, Republicans may 
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choose to leave their political party, or adjust their beliefs regarding rape and pregnancy to better 
align with his.   
However, as already mentioned, Republicans could also respond by politically labeling 
Akins as a “black sheep”.  Indeed, the party officially withdrew its support for Akins following 
his deviant comments (Carey, 2012).  For the minority of Republican Party members who did 
not denounce Akins, an alternate route of attitude adjustment appears to have been activated (i.e., 
McVeigh, 2012).  In doing so these group members appear to trivialize the inaccurate science 
behind Akins claims.  For example, one woman stated that “I’m not a scientist, but there are a lot 
of contradictions…I don’t buy into science.” (McVeigh, 2012).  Research has shown that 
trivialization, as demonstrated by these women, is a frequently employed and effective cognitive 
route to dissonance reduction (Simon, Greenbert, & Brehm, 1995).  For example, Simon et al. 
(1995) found that when participants’ preexisting attitudes were made salient prior to a 
counterattitudinal behavior task, they were more likely to trivialize their engagement in the 
behavior (study 1).  Furthermore, the mode of dissonance reduction (trivialization versus attitude 
change) depended upon the options presented to participants first (study 2), but that the ability to 
engage in self-affirmation resulted in trivialization as a means to reduce dissonance (study 3).  
However, making issue importance salient after participants engaged in counterattitudinal 
behavior increased the likelihood of engaging in trivialization, regardless of whether participants 
were able to self-affirm or not (study 4).  The authors hypothesized that this was because the 
specific issues made salient were not personally valued by the participants.  Attitude change was 
only likely to occur when preexisting attitudes were not highly salient, when participants were 
required to express their attitude prior to any opportunity to trivialize, their ability to self-affirm 
was restricted, and when dissonant attitudes were not related to an important issue.  Issue 
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salience is essential, so individuals must be aware that there is dissonant information regarding 
abortion present.  Therefore, only when statements regarding legitimate rape are known to be 
inaccurate will individuals experience dissonance. 
 
Political Socialization and Identity 
With social identity defined in terms of political affiliation in this current research, it is 
important to understand both the psychological, and political science perspectives, on the genesis 
and development of individuals’ political party identification.   
As noted by Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009), politics in America are divided between 
two opposing parties with competing ideologies which originate in social, emotional, and 
religious differences.  From the psychological perspective, ingroup or outgroup status is defined 
simply by our perceived membership in a particular social group (e.g. “hipsters”, “band geeks”) 
or institution (e.g., Republican/Democratic party).  The development of political affiliation is 
considered to be a bottom-up process, based on underlying psychological constructs (i.e., moral 
foundation; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) or needs, which are expressed or fulfilled by 
membership in a particular political party (Jost, Frederico & Napier, 2009). 
From a political science perspective, membership in a political group is seen as the 
outcome of a process of political socialization, wherein individuals learn political behaviors and 
beliefs from others.  Historically, research on political socialization has focused on the role of 
parents and institutions (i.e., schools) as transmitters of political beliefs, particularly during 
childhood (Hyman, 1959).  However, this perspective has been abandoned to some extent due to 
inconsistencies in, and misinterpretation of the empirical research (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995).  
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More recent research focuses on the development of political beliefs and party membership 
specifically in regards to an individuals’ overall social network versus parental and institutional 
transmission (Settle, Bond, & Levitt, 2011).  This perspective represents a top-down approach, in 
that political attitudes develop via a framework constructed by those in authority (i.e., parents, 
political elites; Jost, Frederico, & Napier, 2009).   
In considering the approaches of psychology and political science in understanding 
political identification, it is important to consider the continued transformation of political 
identity in America, particularly in the South where the majority of the sample for this research 
will be drawn from.  The divisions which currently distinguish the Republican and Democratic 
parties in the South have their roots in continued resentment towards Federal interference during 
the Civil Rights movement, shifting demographics, and southerners own shifting perceptions of 
party ideologies (Black & Black, 1976; Black & Black, 2002; Hayes & McKee, 2008).   
American’s perception of party ideology has changed dramatically since the 1990s, 
particularly in the South.  While southerners’ self-perception of being moderates has remained 
stable, perceived liberalism of the Democratic Party has increased dramatically, despite its 
former identity as the face of the South, and of Georgia specifically (Hayes & McKee, 2008; 
Bullock & Rozell, 2010, Chapter 2).  This shift in identity has resulted in Republicans now being 
viewed as more conservative than the average southerner, but with less of a distance in ideology 
than that of the liberal Democrats and the average southerner (Hayes & McKee, 2008).  The 
beginnings of the ideological association of conservatism with Republicans began in the 1960s, 
as Civil Rights legislation was passed in to law while a Democrat was in the White House (Black 
& Black, 2002).  The traditionally Democratic, and conservative South, perceived this as a 
betrayal by Party leadership; however, given the electoral monopoly the Democrats had over 
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politics in the south, and their ability to control and distribute resources to their constituents, 
drastic changes in party membership were not seen until the 1990s  (Black & Black, 2002).  
 Georgia specifically is an example of this paradigm shift, having seen some of the most 
dramatic changes in Republican control over the last twenty years, now holding a strong majority 
of political offices in the state and an increasing voter base (Bullock & Rozell, 2010, Chapter 2).  
As indicated above, this realignment of party dominance, particularly for Republicans, has its 
roots is in the changing perceptions of the parties, rather than an actual ideological shift in the 
electorate (Hayes & McKee, 2008; McKee, 2010).  Additionally, due to these shifting 
perceptions and associated changes in party identification between Republicans and Democrats, 
participant behavior based solely on their party identification may not always be consistent.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF CURRENT STUDIES 
 
 
The goal of the present research is to determine which psychological processes could 
contribute to ongoing support for a deviant political ingroup member.  Particularly, what role 
does social identity as either a Republican or Democrat play in the evaluation of a political 
ingroup or outgroup members’ statement regarding rape, decision to vote for that 
ingroup/outgroup politician, and cognitive processes activated by this decision?  When cognitive 
dissonance is aroused, which route to dissonance reduction would participants take?  Will they 
trivialize the statement, reject the political ingroup member, or adjust their attitudes in order to 
match those of the ingroup member?   Continuing with the previous political exemplar, it is 
proposed that increased support for Akins has come at the cost of adjusted beliefs regarding rape, 
in particular, rape myth acceptance.  Payne, Lonsway, and Fitzgerald (1999) found that rape 
myth acceptance functions as system justification by trivializing rape, reassigning blame from 
perpetrator to victim, and discounting it as a deviant and rare act.    Endorsing a “legitimate rape” 
standard in determining access to abortion not only serves as justification for reduced access to 
abortion, but as a reaffirmation of the belief that rape is indeed a rare and deviant event.   
Endorsing the belief that rape trauma can prevent pregnancy serves as a system 
justification, and individuals are motivated to ignore information which contradicts it.  However, 
it is difficult for anyone to avoid all information which contradicts this belief, and in this case, 
there was continual national media coverage which “debunked” Akins statement, arousing 
dissonance for members of his party.   Akins statement regarding rape was medically inaccurate, 
and these medical inaccuracies were addressed by the American Congress of Obstetricians in a 
statement released to the media (“Statement on Rape,” 2012).  As utilized in the current 
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methodology, debunking is defined as a process by which deviance from a social norm is made 
salient, in which information is presented which explicitly addresses this deviance.   
In response, to their ingroup members’ deviance, individuals could leave their political 
party, reject the specific politician as being a “black sheep”, or adjust their rape myth acceptance 
to incorporate the dissonant cognitions.  Given that abortion is a political wedge issue, and a lack 
of highly similar alternatives to their current political party affiliation, it is not likely that 
individuals will leave the ingroup.  Rather, when presented with information which debunks the 
deviant ingroup members statements regarding legitimate rape, dissonance will be aroused by the 
competing cognitions between their political party and the individual politician.  Ingroup 
members will reduce dissonance by either rejecting the deviant ingroup member, or adjusting 
their attitudes, as reflected by increased rape myth acceptance, in order to realign their 
cognitions.  Conversely, if an outgroup member endorses the legitimate rape standard, ingroup 
members will simply reject the outgroup member because there is no threat to the ingroup 
identification or individual self-concept.  
 
Hypotheses 
It was hypothesized that participants who read about a deviant ingroup politician and 
chose to vote for that ingroup politician, and were then debunked, levels of dissonance, 
trivialization, and time two IRMA scores would be significantly higher than for those who vote 
for the ingroup politician and are not debunked.  In contrast, participants who read about a 
deviant ingroup politician and chose to vote for the outgroup politician, levels of dissonance 
would be higher, but they would have significantly lower levels of trivialization and IRMA 
scores at time 2, regardless of debunking.  For participants who read about a deviant outgroup 
member and chose to vote for their ingroup politician, it was hypothesized that they would 
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experience significantly less dissonance and trivialize less than participants who voted for the 
outgroup politician, and that this effect would be seen regardless of debunking and with no 
changes expected on the IRMA at time two.  Conversely, participants who read about a deviant 
outgroup politician will not vote for the outgroup politician, regardless of debunking, with no 
differences expected on dissonance or trivialization measures, or IRMA scores at time two.   
 
Overview of Studies 
In an attempt to acquire a politically diverse sample, participants were recruited from two 
sources: Georgia Southern University and Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTUrk).  MTurk is an 
online forum where jobs, referred to as Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) are posted for workers 
to complete for pay.  Studies indicate that this service is increasingly being used in psychological 
research as a means to recruit a large, nationally representative sample, and results are 
comparable to traditional data collection methods (Mason & Suri, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011).  Participants from Georgia Southern University were recruited from introductory 
and social psychology courses.  Participants from both subject pools were given a link to an 
online survey which was completed using Qualtrics online survey software.   
In order to test for any changes in scores on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale 
(Payne, Lonsway, & Fitzgerald, 1999), data were collected in two phases, completed two weeks 
apart.  Two weeks after completion, participants were given a link to the questionnaire for phase 
two.  Participants from Georgia Southern University were sent the link for phase two via email.  
For participants recruited through MTurk, this link was posted via a new HIT, with instructions 
to only complete the new HIT if they had completed phase one.   
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To ensure that only participants who had completed phase one completed the HIT for 
phase two, a special code was required to be entered at the beginning of the questionnaire.  
However, given the format of MTurk, it is impossible to prevent workers who did not participate 
in phase one from completing the second phase.  Because of this, an additional 80 participants 
from MTurk completed phase two only, only completing the IRMA scale at time 2.  These 
participants were not excluded from analyses as all manipulations and remaining dependent 
variables were measured at time two.  However, the responses of these participants, who did not 
complete time 1 IRMA, were analyzed separately when appropriate. Overall, there were a total 
of 248 participants.  Of these, 87 participants were Georgia Southern University students and 161 
were participants from MTurk.  Of the Georgia Southern University students, 77 were recruited 
during the Spring 2013 semester.  Due to an error in the programming of Qualtrics, all of the 
students who participated during the Spring 2013 semester were assigned to the debunking 
condition. The data from this sample was therefore analyzed separately from all other 
participants and is described in Study 1A below.  The MTurk participants were randomly 
assigned to the debunking or no debunking conditions. An additional ten participants from 
Georgia Southern University were recruited from a Summer 2013 social psychology course. The 
data from these participants are described in Study 1B.  
  
22 
 
CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 1A 
 
Method 
Participants 
There were a total of 77 participants from the Georgia Southern University student 
sample collected in the Spring 2013 semester.  All participants in this sample were assigned to 
the debunking condition.  Of the 77 participants, ten were removed from analysis due to 
answering the manipulation check question regarding debunking incorrectly.  These participants 
inaccurately reported that, according the ACOG statement, the act of rape can prevent 
pregnancy.  Therefore, 67 participants were included in data analyses.   
The average participant age was 19.94 years (SD = 3.28), and ranged from 18-41.  
Participants were 81% European American (White), 18.2% African American (Black), and 1.3% 
Asian American.  The majority of participants indicated their household income (including 
parents’ income if they were still considered a dependent) was under $25,000 (28.6), or between 
$50,001-100,000 (27.3%).  A majority of participants were Republican (53.2%), and the 
remaining were Democrats (46.8%).  Due to the methodology of this research, participants were 
not given additional options regarding party affiliation (e.g., independent, libertarian, tea party).  
Overall, participants considered themselves only somewhat affiliated (39%) with their stated 
political party, 1.3% were very affiliated, and 7.8% were very unaffiliated.  On the liberal-
conservative scale, most participants indicated they were moderate/middle of the road (41.6%).  
However, another 20.8% indicated they were conservative and 9.1% identified as liberal.  The 
majority of participants indicated that they were registered to vote (72.7%), while 27.3% 
indicated they were not registered to vote.   
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An independent samples t-test comparing self-reported liberal or conservativeness by 
political party was conducted.  Results indicated a significant difference in self-reported liberal 
or conservativeness based on political party t(75) = -5.44 p <.01, d = 1.24.  As expected, 
participants who identified as Republicans reported they were more conservative than the 
midpoint of 4.0 (M = 4.76, SD = 1.20) while participants who identified as Democrats reported 
they were more liberal than the midpoint of 4.0 (M = 3.25, SD = 1.23).   
 
Dependent Measures  
 Rape Myth Acceptance. 
Rape myth acceptance was measured using the IRMA (Payne, Lonsway, & Fitzgerald, 
2009).  Participants’ level of rape myth acceptance was measured at time 1, and again following 
the manipulation and all other dependent measures at time 2.  All filler items for the IRMA scale 
were removed prior to analysis of reliability.  Initial analysis of the retained 40-item IRMA at 
time 1 revealed excellent reliability (α = .95).  Analysis of time 2 IRMA was also highly reliable 
(α = .97).  See Table 1 for the means and standard deviations for all measures, and Table 2 for 
correlations between all measures.  See Appendix H for the full IRMA scale. 
 
Cognitive Dissonance. 
Immediately after receiving the debunking statement from ACOG, all participants 
indicated their affective response, at present, on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 8 
(applies very much).  Participants were given a list of adjectives and short statements and asked 
to indicate the extent to which they were feeling that way “right now.”  The dissonance related 
items were taken from Glasford, Dovidio, & Pratto (2009).  In accordance with Glasford et al. 
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(2009), neutral filler items (i.e., “impartial” were added by the researchers as they were not 
included in their original methodology.   In keeping with Glasford et al. (2009), the items were 
averaged to measure both dissonance-related psychological discomfort and negative self-directed 
emotion.  Dissonance related items were “uncomfortable,” “uneasy,” and “bothered” (α = .78).  
Negative self-directed dissonance items were “angry with myself,” “dissatisfied with myself,” 
“disgusted with myself,” and “annoyed with myself” (α = .90).  See Table 1 for the means and 
standard deviations for all measures, and Table 2 for correlations between all measures.    
 
Trivialization. 
Participants completed the trivialization items following the cognitive dissonance 
measures.  Trivialization was measured using a five-item questionnaire created by the 
researchers, designed to measure participants’ trivialization of the politicians’ statement 
regarding rape.  See Appendix G for the complete five-item scale.  Initial analysis of the five-
item trivialization scale revealed Cronbach’s alpha of .19.  Therefore, items 4 (“This politician 
should be kicked out of his political party) and 5 (“Sometimes ‘science’ gets it wrong”) were 
removed and analyzed separately.  The retained three-item scale showed good reliability (α = 
.77).  See Table 1 for the means and standard deviations for all measures, and Table 2 for 
correlations between all measures.    
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Procedure 
Phase One. 
 After giving their consent to participate in this research, participants completed the 
Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale (IRMA; Payne, Fitzgerald, & Lonsway, 1999).  Following 
completion, participants who wished to complete phase two of the research were asked to 
provide their GSU email address where the researchers could send the link for phase two.  
Participants who did not wish to participate in phase two were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation.   
  Phase Two.   
 After again giving their consent to participate in this research, participants completed the 
demographic information.  Next, they were randomly assigned to either the Republican or 
Democrat condition, and then read the statement regarding rape which was attributed to a 
Republican or Democratic politician by their assigned condition.  Participants were then asked to 
indicate how strongly they would endorse the politician after reading the statement.  Next, they 
were asked to imagine they were about to vote in an upcoming congressional election, and to 
indicate whether they would vote for the candidate, their opposition, or not vote at all.  
Immediately following this, all participants read the American Congress of Obstetricians 
(ACOG) statement regarding rape, and then asked to rate their agreement with the ACOG 
statement on a 7-pt Likert-type scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 7= very strongly agree).  Then 
participants completed the cognitive dissonance measure in which they were asked to indicate 
their affective response right now on a scale ranging from 1(does not apply at all) to 7 (applies 
very much).  Following the method used in Glasford, Dovidio, and Pratto (2009), dissonance-
related discomfort items were “uncomfortable,” “uneasy,” and “bothered” and the negative self-
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directed emotion items were “angry with myself,” “dissatisfied with myself,” “disgusted with 
myself,” and “annoyed with myself”.  Additional neutral filler items were interspersed with the 
dissonance related items.  Next, participants were asked to think about the politicians statement 
they read and to indicate their agreement with several statement.  Responses were given on a 1 
(very strongly disagree) to 6 (very strongly agree) scale.  Items were “the media twisted his 
words in to something different than what he really meant,” “He didn’t really mean what he 
said,” “What he said wasn’t really a ‘big deal’,” “This politician should be kicked out of his 
political party,” and “sometimes ‘science’ gets things wrong”.  Following the trivialization items, 
participants completed the IRMA.  Then participants completed a manipulation check where 
they were asked to recall which political party the politician they read about belonged to, with 
response options of Republican or Democrat.  Immediately following this, participants 
completed the debunking check, where they indicated whether the ACOG statement indicated 
that the trauma of rape could actually prevent pregnancy.  Response choices were True or False.  
Next, participants were asked to indicate their current affiliation with their political party, using a 
visual analog (see Appendix J for response options).  Finally, participants were debriefed and 
thanked for their participation.   
 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to determine if participant party affiliation 
(Democrats vs. Republicans) was related to strength of party affiliation, IRMA at time 1, 
Trivialization, Cognitive Dissonance Discomfort, Negative Self Directed Cognitive Dissonance, 
or IRMA at time 2. See Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for all measures.  
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Table 2 presents all correlations between measures as a function of party affiliation. Both levels 
of trivialization and time 2 IRMA scores differed by party affiliation, with Republicans 
trivializing the issue more than did Democrats and Republicans reporting a greater belief in rape 
myths at time 2 than Democrats.  Given the similarity in responding between Republicans and 
Democrats on all other measures and on the strength and direction of correlations between all 
measures, participant political party was not analyzed during the hypothesis testing to save 
statistical power.  
 
Testing of Hypotheses 
 The full design of this study for hypothesis testing was a 2 (politician identity: ingroup 
vs. outgroup member) x 3 (participant vote: ingroup vs. outgroup vs. no vote) between groups 
design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two politician identities.   In the 
current methodology, participant vote is employed as a categorical independent variable rather 
than as a dependent variable.  This was done as it was expected that a participant’s decision to 
vote for either an ingroup or outgroup member would itself influence levels of dissonance, 
trivialization, and IRMA scores.  All participants received the debunking statement from ACOG.  
The dependent variables assessed were cognitive dissonance (general discomfort), cognitive 
dissonance (self-directed negative emotion), trivialization, and time 2 IRMA. The results are 
presented in order of the dependent variables as they were completed by the participants. 
 
 Cognitive Dissonance.   
It was hypothesized that participants who read about a deviant ingroup politician and 
chose to vote for that politician, and were then debunked, would report higher levels of cognitive 
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dissonance than participants who voted for the ingroup politician and were not debunked.  Since 
all participants in the sample were debunked, this hypothesis could not be tested. It was also 
hypothesized that participants who read about a deviant ingroup politician and chose to vote for 
the outgroup politician, regardless of debunking, would have significantly higher levels of 
cognitive dissonance compared to participants who voted for their ingroup politician.  This 
increase in dissonance was expected as participants would be voting in a manner that was 
inconsistent with their political party identity. Participants who read about a deviant outgroup 
politician and chose to vote for their ingroup politician were expected to have significantly lower 
levels of cognitive dissonance, as they would be voting in a manner that was consistent with their 
political party identity.   
 
Dissonance Discomfort. 
A 2(politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 3 (participant vote: ingroup vs. 
outgroup vs. no vote) factorial ANOVA on level of dissonance discomfort revealed no main 
effect of politician identity, with no significant difference between participants who read about 
an ingroup politician (M = 2.91; SD = 1.75) and participants who read about an outgroup 
politician (M =2.90; SD = 1.43), F(1, 62) = .01, p = .94, ɳ2 = .00.  There was also no main effect 
of participant vote, with no significant differences observed between participants who voted for 
the ingroup (M =3.02; SD = 1.51), those who voted for the outgroup (M = 2.96; SD = 1.90), and 
those who chose not to vote (M = 2.56; SD = 1.58), F(2, 62) = .41, p = .66, ɳ2 = .01.  Contrary to 
hypotheses, there was no significant interaction between politician identity and participant vote, 
F(1,62) = .584, p = .45, ɳ2 = .01. 
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Negative Self-Directed Emotion. 
A 2(politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 3 (participant vote: ingroup vs. 
outgroup vs. no vote) factorial ANOVA on level of negative self-directed emotion revealed no 
main effect of politician identity, with no significant differences observed between participants 
who read about an ingroup politician (M = 2.24; SD = 1.57) and those who read about an 
outgroup politician (M = 1.97; SD =1.38), F(1, 62) = .27, p = .61, ɳ2  = .00.  There was no main 
effect of participant vote, with no significant differences observed between participants who 
voted for the ingroup (M = 1.99; SD = 1.33), those who voted for the outgroup (M = 2.78; SD = 
2.16), and those who chose not to vote (M = 1.97; SD = 1.34),  F(2, 62) = .84, p = .44, ɳ2 = 
.03.Contrary to hypotheses, there was no significant interaction between politician identity and 
participant vote, F(1,62) = 2.09, p = .15, ɳ2 = .03. 
 
Trivialization. 
 It was hypothesized that trivialization would be significantly higher for 
participants who read about a deviant ingroup politician and were debunked than those who were 
not debunked.  Since all participants in the sample were debunked, this hypothesis could not be 
tested.  It was also hypothesized that participants who read about a deviant ingroup politician and  
chose to vote for that politician would trivialize the issue more than participants who read about 
a deviant ingroup politician and chose to vote for an outgroup politician or not cast a vote.  This 
increase in trivialization was expected to serve as justification for voting for a deviant ingroup 
member.  It was further hypothesized that participants who read about a deviant outgroup 
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politician and voted for their ingroup politician would trivialize the issue less than those who 
voted for the outgroup politician, regardless of debunking.   
A 2(politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 3 (participant vote: ingroup vs. 
outgroup vs. no vote) factorial ANOVA on level of trivialization revealed no significant main 
effect of politician identity. Participants who read about an ingroup politician (M = 2.60; SD = 
.98) trivialized the issue at similar levels as did participants who read about an outgroup 
politician (M = 2.15; SD = .91), F(1,61) = .72, p = .40, ɳ2= .01. The main effect of voting 
decision was also not significant, with no significant differences in trivialization between 
participants who voted for the ingroup politician (M = 2.26; SD = .99), those who voted for the 
outgroup (M = 2.11; SD = .73), and those who chose not to vote (M = 2.76; SD = .94), F(2, 61) = 
2.63, p = .08, ɳ2 = .08 .  As predicted, results showed a significant interaction of politician 
identity and participant vote on trivialization of the issue, F(1,61) = 5.30, p <.03, ɳ2 = .08.   
Contrary to our expectations, follow up simple effects testing for participants who read 
about an ingroup politician revealed no significant difference in trivialization between those who 
voted for the ingroup politician (M = 3.00; SD = .99), those who voted for the outgroup politician 
(M = 2.11; SD = .73), and those who chose not to vote at all (M = 2.64; SD = 1.05), F(2, 27) = 
2.11, p = .14, ɳ2 = .14.  Follow up simple effects testing showed that for participants who read 
about a deviant ingroup politician and voted for that politician trivialized the issue more (M = 
3.00; SD = .99) than participants who read about a deviant outgroup politician and voted for their 
ingroup member (the political opponent; M = 2.03; SD = .88), t(40) = 2.76, p = .02, d = 1.04, a 
large effect. 
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Follow up simple effects testing also showed that for participants who read about an 
outgroup politician, those who chose to vote for the opposing politician (their ingroup member) 
trivialized the issue less (M = 2.03, SD = .88) than those who chose to not vote at all (M = 3.08, 
SD = .50), F(1,34) = 5.40, p = .03, ɳ2 = .14.   No participants in this condition chose to vote for 
the outgroup politician.   
 
This politician should be kicked out of his political party. 
A 2(politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 3 (participant vote: ingroup vs. 
outgroup vs. no vote) factorial ANOVA on the trivialization item “this politician should be 
kicked out of his political party” revealed no significant main effect of politician identity.  
Participants who read about an ingroup politician (M = 3.07, SD = 1.31), had similar attitudes 
about the politician as did participants who read about an outgroup politician (M = 3.19, SD = 
1.45), F(1, 61) = .39, p = .54, ɳ2 =.00.  The main effect of voting decision was also not 
significant, with no significant differences in attitudes toward the politician between participants 
who voted for the ingroup (M = 3.23, SD = 1.46), those who voted for the outgroup (M = 2.75, 
SD = 1.39), and those who did not vote (M = 3.07, SD = 1.16), F(2, 61) = .47, p = .63, ɳ2 = .02.  
There was also no significant interaction between politician identity or participant vote on 
attitudes toward the politician, F(1, 61) = .96, p = .33, ɳ2 = .02.   
 
Sometimes ‘science’ gets it wrong. 
A 2(politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 3 (participant vote: ingroup vs. 
outgroup vs. no vote) factorial ANOVA on the trivialization item “sometimes ‘science’ gets it 
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wrong” revealed no significant main effect of politician identity.  Participants who read about an 
ingroup politician (M = 2.97, SD = 1.43), trivialized science at similar levels as did participants 
who read about an outgroup member (M = 3.30, SD = 1.24), F(1, 62) = 1.32, p = .26, ɳ2 = .02.  
The main effect of participant vote was also not significant, with no significant difference in 
trivialization of science between participants who voted for the ingroup (M = 3.26, SD = 1.31), 
those who voted for the outgroup (M = 3.00, SD = 1.32), and those who did not vote (M = 2.93, 
SD = 1.44), F(1,62) = .02, p = .98, ɳ2 = .00.  There was also no significant interaction between 
politician identity or participant vote on trivialization of science, F(2, 62) = 1.62, p = .21, ɳ2 = 
.03 
 
IRMA time 2 
It was hypothesized that for participants who read about a deviant ingroup politician, 
chose to vote for that politician, and were debunked, that the change in IRMA scores from time 1 
to time 2 would be significantly higher than that of participants who voted for the ingroup 
politician and were not debunked.  Since all participants in the sample were debunked, this 
hypothesis could not be tested. It was also hypothesized that participants who read about a 
deviant ingroup politician and chose to vote for the outgroup politician would have lower IRMA 
scores at time 2, compared to participants who read about a deviant ingroup politician and chose 
to vote for the ingroup politician, regardless of debunking.   
A 2(politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 3 (participant vote: ingroup vs. 
outgroup vs. no vote) factorial ANOVA on IRMA scores at time two revealed no main effect of 
politician identity, with no significant difference between participants who read about an ingroup 
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politician (M = 2.88; SD = .92), and those who read about an outgroup politician (M = 2.65; SD = 
1.00), F(1, 62) = .06, p = .81, ɳ2 =.00.  There was no main effect of participant vote, with no 
significant difference between participants who voted for the ingroup (M = 2.70; SD = .97), those 
who voted for the outgroup (M = 2.78; SD = .86), and those who chose not to vote (M = 2.89; SD 
= 1.04), F(2, 62) = .30, p = .74 , ɳ2 = .01.  As expected, there was a significant interaction 
between politician identity and participant vote, F (1, 62) = 5.03, p = .03, ɳ2 = .08.   
Contrary to expectations, follow up simple effects testing for participants who read about 
an ingroup politician revealed no significant difference in IRMA time 2 scores between those 
who voted for an ingroup politician (M = 3.20; SD = .74), those who voted for the outgroup 
member (M = 2.78; SD = .86), and those who did not vote (M = 2.68; SD = 1.10), F(2, 27) = .91, 
p = .42; ɳ2 =.06.   Follow up simple effects testing showed marginal effects such that participants 
who read about a deviant ingroup politician and voted for that politician tended to endorse a 
greater belief in rape myths (M = 3.20; SD = .74) than participants who read about a deviant 
outgroup politician and voted for their ingroup member (M = 2.50; SD = .99), t(41) = 1.91, p = 
.06, d = .80. Although the significance level does not reach standard levels of statistical 
significance, this test was underpowered, and showed a large effect size.  
To test whether trivialization mediated these effects, the simple effects test was repeated 
while controlling for trivialization in an ANCOVA.  Results showed that trivialization of the 
issue fully mediated the effects of voting for a deviant ingroup politician on increased rape myths 
at time 2. The effects of voting for a deviant ingroup politician on time 2 rape myths became 
nonsignificant when controlling for trivialization,  F(1, 40) = .54, p = .47.  The mediating effect 
of trivialization on IRMA scores at time 2 is noteworthy and warrants further examination, 
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particularly given the differences on trivialization scores between Republicans and Democrats 
found in the preliminary analyses.  However, given the lack of statistical power when adding this 
variable to the model, the mediation was not explored further.  See Appendix K for a proposed 
conception of this process.   
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 1B 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
There were a total of 171 participants in this sample.  Participants came from two 
populations: a Georgia Southern University (GSU) social psychology course and Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk).  Preliminary analyses indicated that the GSU sample (N = 10) 
differed significantly from the MTurk participants on all dependent variables.  Therefore, these 
ten participants were excluded from further analyses as the sample was too small for conducting 
separate analyses.  Differences between both samples on each dependent measure are shown in 
Table 3. The remaining analyses using the MTurk sample included 161 participants.   
Because GSU participants were excluded from all analyses prior to hypothesis testing, 
demographic information is provided for MTurk participants only.  The average MTurk 
participant age was 29.77 years (SD = 9.96), and ranged from 19 to 68.  Forty-three percent of 
participants categorized themselves as Other race or ethnicity, 37.9% as Asian American, 9.9% 
as European American (White), and 6.8% as African American (Black).  The majority of 
participants indicated their household income was under $25,000 (45.3%), followed by $25,000-
$50,000 (20.5%), $50,001-$100,000 (19.3%), and the 8.7% with income above $100,000, and 
5.6% who were unsure or preferred not to answer.   A majority of participants were Democrats 
(57.8%), and the remaining were Republicans (42.2%).  Due to the methodology of this research, 
participants were not given additional options regarding party affiliation (e.g., independent, 
libertarian, tea party).  Overall, participants considered themselves somewhat affiliated (30.4%) 
with their stated political party, 20.5% were neither affiliated nor unaffiliated, 28.6% were 
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affiliated, 4.3% were very affiliated, and 4.3% were very unaffiliated.  On the liberal-
conservative scale, the majority of participants indicated they were moderate/middle of the road 
(28%), 23.6% were somewhat conservative, 3.1% were very conservative, and 6.8% were very 
liberal. The majority of participants indicated that they were registered to vote (88.8%), and 
11.2% indicated they were not registered to vote.   
An independent samples t-test comparing self-reported liberal or conservativeness by 
political party was conducted.  Results  indicated a significant difference in self-reported liberal 
or conservativeness based on political party t(157) = -2.49, p = .01, d = .40.  As expected, 
participants who identified as Republicans reported they were more conservative (M = 4.37, SD 
= 1.57) than the scale midpoint of 4.0 while participants who identified as Democrats reported 
they were more liberal than the scale midpoint of 4.0 (M = 3.76, SD = 1.49).   
 
 
Dependent Measures 
Rape Myth Acceptance. 
Rape myth acceptance was measured using the IRMA (Payne, Lonsway, and Fitzgerald, 
2009).  Participants’ level of rape myth acceptance was measured at time 1, and again following 
the manipulation and all other dependent measures at time 2.  Eighty-one of the 161 participants 
completed the IRMA at both time 1 and time 2.  All participants completed the IRMA at time 2. 
The scale consists of 45-statements regarding rape (i.e., “rape isn’t as big a problem as some 
feminists would like people to think”), with five filler items interspersed throughout.  Responses 
are given on a 1 (not at all agree) to 7 (very much agree) scale.  All filler items for the IRMA 
scale were removed prior to analysis of reliability.  Initial analysis of the retained 40-item IRMA 
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at time 1 revealed excellent reliability (α = .97).  Analysis of time 2 IRMA was also highly 
reliable (α = .98).  Scores for IRMA time 1 were averaged across all conditions (M = 4.19; SD = 
1.02).  Scores for IRMA time 2 were averaged across all conditions (M = 4.32; SD = 1.09).  See 
Table 3 for the means and standard deviations for all measures, and Table 4 for correlations 
between all measures.  See Appendix H for all IRMA scale items. 
 
Cognitive Dissonance. 
Immediately after receiving the debunking statement from ACOG, all participants 
indicated their affective response, at present, on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 8 
(applies very much).  Participants were given a list of adjectives and short statements and asked 
to indicate the extent to which they were feeling that way “right now.”  The dissonance related 
items were taken from Glasford, Dovidio, & Pratto (2009).  In accordance with Glasford et al. 
(2009), neutral filler items (i.e., “impartial” were added by the researchers as they were not 
included in their original methodology.  In accordance with Glasford el al. (2009), the items were 
averaged to measure both dissonance-related psychological discomfort (M = 4.52; SD = 1.55) 
and negative self-directed emotion (M = 3.86; SD = 1.77).  Dissonance related items were 
“uncomfortable,” “uneasy,” and “bothered” (α = .72).  Negative self-directed dissonance items 
were “angry with myself,” “dissatisfied with myself,” “disgusted with myself,” and “annoyed 
with myself” (α = .88).  See Table 3 for the means and standard deviations for all measures, and 
Table 4 for correlations between all measures. 
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Trivialization. 
Participants completed the trivialization items following the cognitive dissonance 
measures.  Trivialization was measured using a five-item questionnaire created for the purpose of 
the current research, designed to measure participants’ trivialization of the politician’s statement 
regarding rape.  Trivialization items were “the media twisted his words into something different 
than what he really meant,” “he didn’t really mean what he said,” “what he said wasn’t really a 
‘big deal’.” “this politician should be kicked out of his political party,” and “sometimes ‘science’ 
gets things wrong.”  Responses were given on a 1 (very strongly disagree) to 7 (very strongly 
agree) scale.  Initial analysis of the five-item trivialization revealed Cronbach’s alpha of .74.  
Therefore, item 4 (“This politician should be kicked out of his political party”) was removed.  
The retained four-item scale showed good reliability (α = .80).  Scores on these four items were 
combined for an average trivialization score across all conditions (M = 3.67; SD = 1.06).  See 
Appendix G for the complete five-item scale. 
 
Procedure 
Phase One. 
 After giving their consent to participate in this research, participants completed the 
Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale (IRMA; Payne, Fitzgerald, & Lonsway, 1999).  Following 
completion, participants who wished to complete phase two of the research were asked to 
provide their Amazon Mechanical Turk worker ID or GSU email address so that the researchers 
could send the link for phase two.  Participants who did not wish to participate in phase two were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation.   
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  Phase Two.   
 After again giving their consent to participate in this research, participants completed the 
demographic information.  Next, they were randomly assigned to either the Republican or 
Democrat condition, and then read the statement regarding rape which was attributed to a 
Republican or Democratic politician by their assigned condition.  Participants were then asked to 
indicate how strongly they would endorse the politician after reading the statement.  Next, they 
were asked to imagine they were about to vote in an upcoming congressional election, and to 
indicate whether they would vote for the candidate, their opposition, or not vote at all.  
Immediately following this, participants were randomly assigned to be debunked or not 
debunked.  Participants who were assigned to the debunking condition read the American 
Congress of Obstetricians (ACOG) statement regarding rape, and then asked to rate their 
agreement with the ACOG statement on a 7-pt Likert-type scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 7= 
very strongly agree).  All participants then completed the cognitive dissonance measure in which 
they were asked to indicate their affective response right now on a scale ranging from 1(does not 
apply at all) to 7 (applies very much).  Following the method used in Glasford, Dovidio, and 
Pratto (2009), dissonance-related discomfort items were “uncomfortable,” “uneasy,” and 
“bothered” and the negative self-directed emotion items were “angry with myself,” “dissatisfied 
with myself,” “disgusted with myself,” and “annoyed with myself”.  Additional neutral filler 
items were interspersed with the dissonance related items.  Next, participants were asked to think 
about the politicians statement they read and to indicate their agreement with several statement.  
Responses were given on a 1 (very strongly disagree) to 6 (very strongly agree) scale.  Items 
were “the media twisted his words in to something different than what he really meant,” “He 
didn’t really mean what he said,” “What he said wasn’t really a ‘big deal’,” “This politician 
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should be kicked out of his political party,” and “sometimes ‘science’ gets things wrong”.  
Following the trivialization items, participants completed the IRMA.  Then participants 
completed a manipulation check where they were asked to recall which political party the 
politician they read about belonged to, with response options of Republican or Democrat.  
Immediately following this, participants who were debunked completed the debunking check, 
where they indicated whether the ACOG statement indicated that the trauma of rape could 
actually prevent pregnancy.  Response choices were True or False.  Next, participants were 
asked to indicate their current affiliation with their political party, using a visual analog (see 
Appendix J for response options).  Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation.   
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to determine if participant party affiliation 
(Democrats vs. Republicans) was related to strength of party affiliation, IRMA at time 1, 
Trivialization, Cognitive Dissonance Discomfort, Negative Self Directed Cognitive Dissonance, 
or IRMA at time 2. Table 3 presents all means and standard deviations by participant party 
affiliation as well as the correlations between all measures as a function of party affiliation. Only 
levels of trivialization differed by party affiliation, with Republicans trivializing the issue more 
than did Democrats. Given the similarity in responding between Republicans and Democrats on 
all other measures and on the strength and direction of correlations between all measures, 
participant political party was not analyzed during the hypothesis testing to save statistical 
power.  
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 The initial design of this study was a 2 (politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) 
x 3 (participant vote: ingroup vs. outgroup vs. no vote) x 3 (debunked: debunked vs. not 
debunked) between groups design.  As with study 1A, participant vote is used as a categorical 
independent variable rather than as a dependent variable as it was expected that a participant’s 
decision to vote for either an ingroup or outgroup member would itself influence levels of 
dissonance, trivialization, and IRMA scores.   Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
politician identities (ingroup or outgroup member), and then randomly assigned to a debunking 
condition (read the ACOG statement or did not read ACOG statement).  Participant political 
party and participant vote were participant variables.  However, analyses of the debunking 
manipulation check showed that 37 (44.5%) of the participants randomly assigned to read the 
debunking statement answered the manipulation check correctly, while 46 (55%) of the 
participants randomly assigned to read the debunking statement answered the manipulation 
check incorrectly. Seventy-five participants were randomly assigned to the no debunking 
condition. We reasoned that the 46 participants who were debunked but inaccurately reported 
that the ACOG statement indicated that trauma of rape can prevent pregnancy may be 
particularly likely to trivialize the issue, and express higher rape myth acceptance compared to 
the 37 participants who were debunked and accurately stated that the ACOG statement reported 
that rape cannot prevent pregnancy and compared to the 75 participants who were not debunked. 
In support of this concern, participants’ time 1 IRMA scores were significantly related to 
whether they answered the debunking manipulation check correctly or not.  Higher scores on the 
IRMA time 1 were associated with answering the manipulation check incorrectly, r(46) = .30, p 
= .04. 
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The resultant number of cells in the design of the study increased to 18, with a 2 
(politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 3 (participant vote: ingroup vs. outgroup vs. 
no vote) x 3 (debunked: debunked vs. not debunked) between groups design.  Given that only 
161 participants completed the study, the number of participants per cell decreased to an average 
of 9. In order to preserve statistical power while still testing the main hypotheses, we made an 
apriori decision before hypotheses testing to collapse two levels of participants’ voting choice. 
Specifically, we reasoned that theoretically, from a social identity perspective, participants who 
chose to leave their political party ingroup by either voting for the political opponent or not 
voting at all would be psychologically more similar to each other, and psychologically distinct, 
from participants who chose to vote for their ingroup member. As participants were asked to 
imagine they were voting in a real election, their decision to vote for anyone other than their 
political party candidate would take votes away from their ingroup party and reduce their 
chances of electoral success.  This decision resulted in the final design for hypotheses testing, a 2 
(politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 2 (participant vote: ingroup vs. outgroup/ no 
vote) x 3 (debunked: correct vs. incorrect vs. not debunked) between groups design, which 
allowed us to have an average of 13 participants per cell.   
 
Testing of Hypotheses 
Cognitive Dissonance. 
It was hypothesized that for participants who read about a deviant ingroup politician 
chose to vote for that politician, and were debunked, that cognitive dissonance would be 
significantly higher than for those who voted for the ingroup politician and were not debunked.  
Participants who read about a deviant ingroup politician and chose to vote for the outgroup 
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politician would also have significantly higher levels of cognitive dissonance, regardless of 
debunking.  Participants who read about a deviant outgroup politician and chose to vote for their 
ingroup politician were expected to have significantly lower levels of cognitive dissonance.  
 
Dissonance Discomfort. 
A 2(politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 2(participant vote: ingroup vs. 
outgroup/no vote) x 3(debunked: correct vs. incorrect vs. not debunked) factorial ANOVA on 
level of dissonance discomfort revealed no main effect of participant vote, with participants who 
voted for the ingroup (M = 4.52; SD = 1.51) experiencing similar levels of dissonance as those 
who voted for the outgroup or did not vote (M = 4.51; SD = 1.60), F(1,147) = .00, p = .99, ɳ2 = 
.00.  There was no significant main effect of politician identity, with participants who read about 
an ingroup member (M = 4.47; SD = 1.60) experiencing similar levels of dissonance as an 
outgroup member (M = 4.57; SD = 1.50), F(1,147) = 1.13, p = .29, ɳ2 = 01.  There was no 
significant main effect of debunking, with participants who answered the debunking 
manipulation check incorrectly (M = 4.56; SD = 1.33) trivializing the issue at the same level as 
those who answered the manipulation check correctly (M = 4.91; SD = 1.52), and those who 
were not debunked (M = 4.30; SD= 1.66), F(1,147) = 1.64, p = .20, ɳ2 = .02.  There was no 
significant interaction between participant vote and politician identity, F(1,147) = .85, p = .36, ɳ2 
= .01.  There was no significant interaction between participant vote and debunking, F(2,147) = 
.98, p = .38, ɳ2 = .01.  Results showed a significant interaction between politician identity and 
debunking F(2,147) = 3.65, p = .03, ɳ2 = .05.   
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Follow up simple effects testing showed that for participants who read about an outgroup 
politician, those that answered the debunking manipulation check correctly (M = 5.60; SD = 
1.19) experienced more dissonance discomfort than did participants who answered the 
debunking manipulation check incorrectly (M = 4.49; SD = 1.11), and those who were not 
debunked (M = 4.17; SD = 1.66), F(2,75) = 5.84, p = .00, ɳ2 = .14.  The follow up simple effects 
testing for participants who read about an ingroup member showed that there were no significant 
differences in dissonance discomfort between those who answered the debunking manipulation 
check correctly (M = 4.38; SD = 1.56), those who answered the manipulation check incorrectly ( 
M = 4.65; SD = 1.60), and those who were not debunked (M =  4.42; SD = 1.66), F (2,78) = .18, 
p = .84, ɳ2 =.00.   
 
Dissonance: Negative Self-Directed Emotion. 
A 2(politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 2(participant vote: ingroup vs. 
outgroup/ no vote) x 3(debunked: correct vs. incorrect vs. not debunked) factorial ANOVA on 
level of negative self-directed emotion revealed no main effect of participant vote.  Participants 
who voted for the ingroup politician (M = 3.97; SD = 1.68) had similar levels of negative self-
directed emotion as those who voted for the outgroup politician or did not vote (M = 3.73; SD = 
1.90), F(1,148) = .86, p = .36, ɳ2 = .01.  There was no significant main effect of debunking, with 
participants who answered the debunking manipulation incorrectly (M = 4.09; SD = 1.66) 
experiencing similar levels of negative self-directed emotion as those who answered the 
debunking manipulation check correctly (M = 3.61; SD = 1.60), and those who were not 
debunked (M = 3.85; SD = 1.92), F(2,148) = .67, p = .51, ɳ2 = .01.  There was no main effect of 
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politician identity, with participants who read about an ingroup politician (M = 3.94; SD = 1.83) 
experiencing similar levels of negative self-directed emotion as those who read about an 
outgroup politician (M = 3.79; SD = 1.71), F(1,148) = 1.34, p = .25, ɳ2 = .01.  There was no 
significant interaction between debunking and politician identity, F(2, 148) = .80, p = .45, ɳ2 = 
.01, no significant interaction between debunking and participant vote, F(2,148) = .32, p = .73, 
ɳ2 = .00, no significant interaction between politician identity and participant vote, F(1,148) = 
1.04, p = .31, ɳ2 = .01, nor was there a significant three-way interaction between participant vote, 
politician identity, and debunking, F(2,148) = .16, p = .86, ɳ2 =  .00.   
 
Trivialization.  
It was hypothesized that trivialization would be significantly higher for participants who 
read about a deviant ingroup politician and were debunked than those who were not debunked.  
Participants who voted for a deviant ingroup member would have significantly higher 
trivialization.  Participants who read about a deviant outgroup politician and vote for their 
ingroup politician would trivialize significantly less than those who voted for the outgroup 
politician, regardless of debunking.   
A 2 (politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 3(participant vote: ingroup vs 
outgroup/ no vote) x 3 (debunked: correct vs. incorrect vs. not debunked) factorial ANOVA on 
level of trivialization revealed a main effect of participant vote.  Participants who voted for the 
ingroup politician trivialized the issue more (M = 3.85; SD = .97) than those who voted for the 
outgroup or did not vote at all (M = 3.43; SD = 1.14), F(1,149) = 4.92, p = .03, ɳ2 =  .03.  There 
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was also a main effect of debunking with participants who answered the debunking manipulation 
check incorrectly trivializing the issue more (M = 4.03; SD = .83) than those who were not 
debunked (M = 3.66; SD = 1.06), and those who answered the manipulation check correctly (M = 
3.25; SD = 1.19), F(2,149) = 3.49, p = .04, ɳ2 = .04.  There was no significant main effect of 
politician identity, with participants who read about in ingroup politician (M = 3.71; SD = 1.10) 
trivializing the issue at similar levels than did participants who read about an outgroup politician 
(M = 3.62; SD = 1.03), F(1,149) = 2.48, p = .12, ɳ2 = .02.  There was no significant interaction 
between participant vote and politician identity, F(2,149) = 1.07, p = .30, ɳ2 = .01, no significant 
interaction between participant vote and debunking, F(2, 149) = .45, p = .64, ɳ2 = .01, no 
significant interaction between politician identity and debunking, F(2,149) = .67, p = .52, ɳ2 = 
.01, nor was there a significant three-way interaction between participant vote, politician identity, 
and debunking, F(2, 149), = 1.38, p = .26, ɳ2 = .02.   
 
This politician should be kicked out of his political party. 
A 2(politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 2(participant vote: ingroup vs. 
outgroup/no vote) x 3 (debunked: correct vs. incorrect vs. not debunked) factorial ANOVA on 
the trivialization item “this politician should be kicked out of his political party” revealed no 
significant main effect of politician identity.  Participants who read about an ingroup politician 
(M = 2.95, SD = 1.34) reported similar levels as did participants who read about an outgroup 
politician (M = 2.77, SD = 1.19), F(1,146) = .09, p = .76, ɳ2 = .00.   The main effect of voting 
decision was also not significant, with no significant differences in attitudes toward the politician 
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between participants who voted for the ingroup (M = 2.77; SD = 1.15) and those who voted for 
the outgroup or did not vote (M = 2.97; SD = 1.40), F(1,146) = 1.45, p = .23, ɳ2 = .01.   The main 
effect of debunking was also not significant, with no significant differences in attitudes toward 
the politician between participants who answered the debunking manipulation check incorrectly 
(M = 2.77; SD = 1.12), those who were not debunked (M = 3.01; SD = 1.36), and those who 
answered the manipulation check correctly (M = 2.66; SD = 1.24), F(2,146) = 1.18, p = .31, ɳ2 = 
.02. There was no significant interaction between politician identity or participant vote, F(1,146) 
= .54, p = .47, ɳ2 = .00, no significant interaction between politician identity or debunking, 
F(2,146) = .06, p = .95, ɳ2 = .00, and no significant interaction between debunking and 
participant vote, F(2, 146) = .38, p = .68, ɳ2 = .01, nor was there a significant three-way 
interaction between debunking, participant vote, and politician identity, F(2,146) = .26, p = .77, 
ɳ2 = .00.     
 
IRMA time 2. 
It was hypothesized that participants who read about a deviant ingroup politician, chose 
to vote for that politician, and were debunked, IRMA scores at time 2 would be significantly 
higher than participants who voted for the ingroup politician and were not debunked.  
Participants who read about a deviant ingroup politician and chose to vote for the outgroup 
politician would have lower IRMA scores at time 2, regardless of debunking.  Participants who 
read about a deviant outgroup politician and chose to vote for their ingroup politician were not 
expected differ significantly on IRMA scores at time 2.   
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A 2 (politician identity: ingroup vs. outgroup member) x 2(participant vote: ingroup vs. 
outgroup/no vote) x 3 (debunked: correct vs. incorrect vs. not debunked) factorial ANOVA on 
IRMA scores at time two revealed a significant main effect of debunking, with participants who 
answered the debunking manipulation check correctly (M = 3.83; SD = 1.22) indicating 
significantly lower scores on IRMA time 2 than participants who answered the debunking 
manipulation check incorrectly (M = 4.65; SD = .85) and those who were not debunked (M = 
4.46; SD =.87), F(2,149) = 4.57, p = .01, ɳ2 = .06.  Given this significant finding additional 
analyses were conducted to determine if there was a significant change in IRMA scores from 
time 1 to time 2 based on the debunking condition.  A 2 (IRMA: time 1 vs. time 2) x 3 
(Debunking: debunk check correct vs. debunk check incorrect vs. not debunked) mixed ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the first factor was conducted to test for significant differences in 
IRMA scores.  There was no significant main effect of time on IRMA scores, F(1,78) = 1.91, p = 
.17, ɳ2 = .02.  There was a significant interaction between debunking and time, F(2,78) = 3.21, p 
= .05, ɳ2 = .08.  Follow-up simple effects testing revealed that for those who were debunked and 
answered the debunking check correctly, there was no significant differences in IRMA scores 
from time 1 (M = 3.82, SD = 1.19) to time 2 (M = 3.64, SD = 1.15), F(1,21) = 1.74, p = .20, ɳ2 = 
.08.  For those who were debunked but answered the debunking check incorrectly, there was no 
significant differences in IRMA scores from time 1 (M = 4.45, SD = .88) to time 2 (M = 4.58, SD  
= 1.00), F(1,25) = 1.92, p = .18, ɳ2 = .07.  While these results did not reach the conventional 
levels of statistical significance, they trended in the expected direction, with participants who 
were debunked and answered the debunking check correctly having lower IRMA scores at time 
2, and those who were debunked and answered the debunking check incorrectly having higher 
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IRMA scores at time 2.  Interestingly, those who were not debunked showed a significant 
decrease in IRMA scores from time 1 (M = 4.23, SD = .96) to time 2 (M = 4.06, SD = 1.06),  
F(1,32) = 5.53, p = .03, ɳ2 = .15.   
There was a significant main effect of politician identity, with participants who read 
about an ingroup politician (M = 4.43; SD = 1.14) indicating significantly higher scores on 
IRMA time 2 than participants who read about an outgroup politician (M = 4.20; SD = 1.14), 
F(1,149) = 5.18, p = .02, ɳ2 = .03.  There was no significant main effect of participant vote, with 
participants who voted for the ingroup member indicating similar IRMA scores at time 2 (M = 
4.45; SD = .95) as participants who voted for the outgroup or did not vote (M = 4.14; SD = 1.24), 
F(1,149) = 3.56, p = .06, ɳ2 = .02. There was not a significant interaction between debunking and 
politician identity, F(2,149) = .65, p = .53, ɳ2 = .01, no significant interaction between debunking 
and participant vote, F(2,149) = .11, p = .90, ɳ2 = .00, no significant interaction between 
politician identity and participant vote, F(1,149) = .04, p = .85, ɳ2 = .00, nor was there a 
significant three-way interaction between debunking, politician identity, and participant vote, 
F(3,149) = .32, p = .73, ɳ2 = .00.   
Additional analyses were conducted to determine if there were any significant differences 
between time 1 IRMA scores for participants who completed both phases of the study and time 2 
IRMA scores for those who only completed phase two. This analysis gave us another method of 
assessing the effects of the experimental procedure. By comparing the time 2 IRMA scores of 
participants who only completed phase 2, with the time 1 scores of the participants who 
completed both phases, we were able to assess the effects of the experimental procedure on 
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IRMA scores without the contamination of the previous measurement of IRMA scores.  Results 
revealed significantly lower IRMA scores at time 1 for those who completed both phases (M = 
4.19, SD = 1.02) than time 2 IRMA scores for those who only completed phase 2 (M = 4.53, SD 
= 1.03), t(159) = -2.10, p = .04, d =  .33.   
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
 
Summary and Implications for Theory and Research 
 
This thesis attempted to determine whether deviant behavior from a political ingroup 
member would arouse dissonance from party members, and which routes to dissonance reduction 
they would take.  Across both studies, the only observable difference between Republicans and 
Democrats was on levels of trivialization and IRMA scores at time 2.  Republicans from both 
studies trivialized the politicians’ behavior significantly more than did Democrats.  Republicans 
also had higher scores on IRMA at time 2, but only for participants in the GSU sample.  While 
additional analysis of these findings would have contributed significantly to the current research, 
methodological limitations made it impossible to explore these differences further without risk of 
Type 1 errors.  However, there was a trend in the correlations between IRMA and trivialization 
scores, such that higher scores on one were correlated with higher scores on the other.    
Significant differences in trivialization were seen as a main effect of participant vote, 
with those who voted for the ingroup trivializing the politicians statement more than participants 
who voted for the outgroup politician.  This is consistent with social identity theory, in that there 
was no motivation for participants who voted for an outgroup member to trivialize the statements 
made by the politician.  However, this finding was not consistent with the lack of significant 
differences in trivialization based on whether the politician himself was an ingroup, versus 
outgroup member.   Consistent with theory, no participants who read about an outgroup 
politician then decided to vote for the outgroup politician.  Most interesting are the demonstrated 
differences in trivialization based on political affiliation, with Republicans trivializing the 
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politicians’ statement regarding rape more than Democrats, regardless of whether the politician 
the statement was attributed to was a political ingroup or outgroup member.  Perhaps basic 
ideological differences regarding abortion can account for the increased trivialization seen for 
Republican participants.  Given that the Republican Party is pro-life, they may be more likely to 
trivialize the inaccurate statement regarding the relationship between rape and pregnancy in 
order to maintain support for their pro-life position, even if the statement was attributed to a 
Democratic politician.  Democrats, on the other hand, are pro-choice and may be less likely to 
trivialize the statement because there is no need to defend it in order to maintain support for their 
stance on the issue.   
Contrary to the hypotheses there was no main effect of dissonance in response to the 
politicians’ statement based on his ingroup or outgroup status.   Participants indicated similar 
levels of dissonance regardless of whether they read about a deviant ingroup or outgroup 
politician.  This finding is also at odds with social identity theory, in that participants who read 
about an ingroup member should have experienced significantly more dissonance than those who 
read about an outgroup member, regardless of who they decided to vote for.  This finding 
warrants further investigation.  It is possible that reading about a topic such as abortion, or 
“legitimate rape” was itself enough to arouse cognitive dissonance, and could explain the similar 
levels across conditions as all participants read about the same issue.  There was a significant 
difference in dissonance scores for the MTurk sample based on debunking, with those who read 
about an outgroup member and were debunked and answered the manipulation check correctly 
experiencing more dissonance discomfort than those who answered incorrectly, or were not 
debunked. 
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Perhaps some of the most interesting findings involved changes on IRMA scores.  For 
participants in both samples, reading about an ingroup politician was associated with 
significantly higher scores on the IRMA at time 2.  Significant differences in IRMA at time 2 
were also seen as a function of debunking, but this effect could only be seen in the MTurk 
sample as all participants in the GSU sample were debunked.  Those who answered the 
debunking manipulation check correctly had significantly lower IRMA scores at time 2 than did 
participant who answered this incorrectly, or were not debunked.  There was a mediating effect 
of trivialization on voting for a deviant ingroup politician and the increase in IRMA scores at 
time 2, such that for those who read about a deviant ingroup politician and then voted for that 
ingroup member trivialized the issue itself, which then resulted in increased rape myth 
acceptance.  On the other hand, for those who read about a deviant outgroup member and the 
voted for their ingroup member trivialized the issue less, and exhibited less rape myth 
acceptance.  This mediating effect of trivialization has the potential for big consequences to the 
electoral process and on political polarization.  Trivializing a politician’s or political party’s 
inaccurate stance on any given issue (e.g., racial inequality, over-regulation of industry) could 
result in attitude change, as demonstrated by this research, simply as a means of justifying a vote 
for a political ingroup member.       
The differences in dissonance discomfort and IRMA scores at time 2 as a function of 
debunking condition have important implications for both the current and future research.  While 
changes were not seen on all dependent variables based on debunking, these changes are 
consistent with cognitive dissonance theory.  When reading the statement regarding legitimate 
rape and abortion, participants must be aware that there are facts which contradict it in order for 
dissonance to occur.  For those who were not debunked, it is likely that lower dissonance scores 
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reflect a lack of this awareness, or at least a lowered awareness which makes it easier for them to 
discount any dissonance which occurs.  Higher levels of dissonance make attitude change more 
likely, and there appears to be some evidence for attitude change based on the increased rape 
myth acceptance seen at time 2.   
Interestingly, participants who read about an outgroup member, were debunked, and 
answered the debunking manipulation check correctly experienced more dissonance discomfort 
than those who answered the manipulation check incorrectly or were not debunked, regardless of 
who they decided to vote for.  Perhaps participants who answered the debunking manipulation 
check correctly internalized the debunking information, and that this internalization increased the 
salience of the issue for them, which in turn made them uncomfortable regardless of whether 
they read about an ingroup or outgroup politician.  Conversely, for those who were debunked 
and answered the debunking check incorrectly may have been experiencing reactance to the 
debunking information itself and felt less uncomfortable overall because they dismissed the 
information.       
 
Limitations 
 The current research is limited by several factors.  First among them is the small sample 
size.  The number of participants required in order to adequately address statistical limitations in 
this model was not reached within the time frame allowed for this project.  Many of the planned 
analyses which would have fully tested the hypotheses would also have been severely 
underpowered.  Despite initial results which revealed only a significant difference across 
participant party on trivialization, it is possible that a larger sample would reveal significant 
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differences between Republicans and Democrats on all dependent variables.  In addition to the 
small sample size, failure to add the debunking condition to study 1A limits the understanding of 
its effects and the comparison across samples.   
Participant demographics may also have played a crucial role in the similarities on all 
measures across participant party.  While past research has shown that participants recruited 
from MTurk do not differ significantly from those recruited via more traditional methods, it is 
important to note that MTurk workers come from around the globe.  The current research 
required that MTurk participants be U.S. citizens, but was not possible to screen out non-citizen 
participants prior to completing the survey.  They could only be excluded during analyses, which 
could also have severely limited the current research.  If participants were not actually U.S. 
citizens, it cannot be assumed that they would have an understanding of the ideological 
differences between American political parties.  However, as indicated in the preliminary results, 
participant self-reported liberal or conservativeness was consistent with the associated political 
parties, which lessens this concern.   
 
Future Directions.   
While there are several research findings with interesting implications for social identity 
theory and cognitive dissonance theory, the current study is limited in many ways that should be 
addressed before fully considering their impact.  First, methodological flaws such as the 
programming error which resulted in all participants in the GSU sample being debunked should 
be corrected.  The study could also be replicated with a larger sample size to determine if the 
findings discussed here are consistent.  Specifically, it should be determined whether the 
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similarities between Republicans and Democrats, particularly in regards to trivialization, holds 
true with a larger sample, and with one in which all participants can reasonably be assumed to 
have an affiliation with one party or the other.    Including an issue which is more associated as 
being a controversial “Democratic” one (i.e., global warming) may be useful in providing a 
contrast to the issue utilized in the current study. 
Additionally, changes in the order of the presentation of the dependent measures should 
be made, such that participants can choose to vote for a political candidate either before or after 
they are debunked in order to better understand the changes seen in dissonance and trivialization.  
Currently, participants were required to vote for a candidate immediately after reading the 
politicians statement regarding rape.  For all participants, the simple act of choosing to vote for 
either an ingroup or outgroup member could increase or decrease their levels of cognitive 
dissonance or trivialization, but would be undetectable using the current methodology.  In 
regards to the trivialization measure, there is no standardized measure available which has been 
empirically validated.  As demonstrated in the current research, this measure was not reliable 
across samples and required modification from study 1A to 1B.  One possible solution is to 
create a reliable measure of trivialization, and use it in a replication of the current research.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table 1  
 
Means and Standard Deviations by Population 
 
  Republicans  Democrats 
Measure  M  SD  M  SD 
1.  IRMA T1  2.98  .75  2.65  .87 
2.  IRMA T2  2.99  .97**  2.50  .90** 
3.  Dissonance     
     Discomfort 
 
2.90 
 
1.66 
 
2.92 
 
1.49 
4.  Negative 
Self- 
     Directed    
     Emotion 
 
1.80 
 
1.28 
 
2.41 
 
1.60 
5.  
Trivialization 
 
2.79 
 
.76** 
 
2.33 
 
.87** 
**p < .05 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 2  
 
Correlations between all Dependent Variables by Political Party 
 
Measures 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Republicans      
1. IRMA T1 
 
--- .85** -.10 .00 .42* 
2.IRMA T2 
 
--- --- -.01 .13 .70** 
3.Dissonance 
Discomfort 
 
--- --- --- .56** -.22 
4.  Negative 
Self-Directed 
Emotion 
 
--- --- --- --- .03 
5.  
Trivialization 
 
--- --- --- --- --- 
 Democrats      
1. IRMA T1  --- .91** .15 .21 .65** 
2.IRMA T2  --- --- .31 .40* .62** 
3.Dissonance 
Discomfort 
 
--- --- --- .79** .07 
4.  Negative 
Self-Directed 
Emotion 
 
--- --- --- --- .14 
5.  
Trivialization 
 
--- --- --- --- --- 
**p<.05 
*p<.01 
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APPENDIX C 
Table 3  
 
Means and Standard Deviations by Population 
 
 
 
Georgia Southern University 
 
Amazon Mechanical Turk 
Measure 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
1.  IRMA T1 
 
2.00 
 
.79 
 
4.19 
 
1.02 
2.  IRMA T2 
 
1.82 
 
.71 
 
4.32 
 
1.09 
3.  Dissonance     
     Discomfort 
 
2.90 
 
2.06 
 
4.52 
 
1.55 
4.  Negative 
Self- 
     Directed    
     Emotion 
 
1.65 
 
.87 
 
3.86 
 
1.06 
5.  
Trivialization 
 
2.18 
 
.77 
 
3.67 
 
1.06 
Note.  All differences are significant at the p < .05 level 
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APPENDIX D 
Table 4 
 
Correlations between all Dependent Variables by Political Party 
 
Measures  1 2 3 4 5 M SD 
 Republicans        
1. IRMA T1  --- .84** .14 .42** .66** 4.22 1.11 
2.IRMA T2  --- --- .24 .52** .70** 4.50 .94 
3.Dissonance Discomfort  --- --- --- .65** .31* 4.58 1.57 
4.  Negative Self-Directed 
Emotion 
 
--- --- --- --- .45** 4.13 1.77 
5.  Trivialization  --- --- --- --- --- 4.00 .85 
 Democrats        
1. IRMA T1  --- .90** .14 .43** .63** 4.17 1.11 
2.IRMA T2  --- --- .20 .56** .76** 4.18 1.18 
3.Dissonance Discomfort  --- --- --- .59** .24** 4.47 1.54 
4.  Negative Self-Directed 
Emotion 
 
--- --- --- --- .62** 3.67 1.75 
5.  Trivialization  --- --- --- --- --- 3.43 1.14 
**p<.05 
*p<.01 
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APPENDIX E 
 
MANIPULATIONS 
 
REPUBLICAN CONDITION 
 
 
 
The following statement was recently made by a Republican member of the United States 
Congress.  Please read the statement carefully. 
 
“Most women either are not fertile during sexual assault or do not become pregnant 
because the trauma prompts a hormonal response that prevents ovulation.  The fact is that 
women who are raped – who are truly raped – the juices don’t flow, I mean, the body 
functions don’t work and they don’t get pregnant.  The odds that a woman who is raped 
will get pregnant are one in millions and millions and millions.  The traumatic experience of 
rape causes a woman to secrete a certain secretion that tends to kill sperm.  Concern for 
rape victims is a red herring because conceptions from rape occur with approximately the 
same frequency as a snowfall in Miami.” 
 
 
After reading this statement, how strongly would you endorse this politician? 
 
 
I would 
strongly 
oppose 
I would 
oppose 
I would 
somewhat 
oppose 
I would 
somewhat 
support 
I would 
support 
I would 
strongly 
support 
 
 
Please indicate below which decision you are most likely to make (circle one): 
Vote for Republican 
Candidate 
Vote for Democratic 
Opponent 
 
Not vote at all 
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DEMOCRATIC CONDITON 
 
The following statement was recently made by a Democratic member of the United States 
Congress.  Please read the statement carefully. 
 
“Most women either are not fertile during sexual assault or do not become pregnant 
because the trauma prompts a hormonal response that prevents ovulation.  The fact is that 
women who are raped – who are truly raped – the juices don’t flow, I mean, the body 
functions don’t work and they don’t get pregnant.  The odds that a woman who is raped 
will get pregnant are one in millions and millions and millions.  The traumatic experience of 
rape causes a woman to secrete a certain secretion that tends to kill sperm.  Concern for 
rape victims is a red herring because conceptions from rape occur with approximately the 
same frequency as a snowfall in Miami.” 
 
 
After reading this statement, how strongly would you endorse this politician? 
 
 
I would 
strongly 
oppose 
I would 
oppose 
I would 
somewhat 
oppose 
I would 
somewhat 
support 
I would 
support 
I would 
strongly 
support 
 
 
Please indicate below which decision you are most likely to make (circle one): 
Vote for Democratic 
Candidate 
Vote for Republican 
Opponent 
 
 
Not vote at all 
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ACOG STATEMENT 
 
 
 
The following is a statement from the American Congress of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG), the nation’s leading group of physicians providing health care for 
women.  It was issued in August, 2012.  Please read it carefully. 
 
“Recent remarks by a member of the US House of Representatives suggesting that 
“women who are victims of ‘legitimate rape’ rarely get pregnant” are medically inaccurate, 
offensive, and dangerous.  Each year in the US, 10,000-15,000 abortions occur among women 
whose pregnancies are a result of reported rape or incest.  An unknown number of 
pregnancies resulting from rape are carried to term.  There is absolutely no veracity to the 
claim that “If it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to shut that whole thing down.”  
A woman who is raped has no control over ovulation, fertilization, or implantation of a 
fertilized egg (i.e., pregnancy).  To suggest otherwise contradicts basic biological truths.  Any 
person forced to submit to sexual intercourse against his or her will is the victim of rape, a 
heinous crime.  There are no varying degrees of rape.  To suggest otherwise is inaccurate and 
insulting and minimizes the serious physical and psychological repercussions for all victims of 
rape.” 
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APPENDIX F 
 
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE MEASURE 
 
 
For each item below, indicate the extent to which you feel that way right now. 
1) Uncomfortable 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
2) Agreeable 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
3) Angry with myself 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
4) Jovial 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
5) Dissatisfied with myself 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
6) Proud 
 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
7) Annoyed with myself 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
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8) Nice 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
9) Uneasy 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
10) Enthusiastic 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
11) Bothered 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
12) Impartial 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
13) Disgusted with myself 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
14) Fine 
1 
Does not 
apply at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Applies 
very much 
 
  
70 
 
APPENDIX G 
 
TRIVIALIZATION SCALE 
 
REPUBLICAN CONDITION 
 
 
 
Now think about the statement you previously read from the Republican Congressman.  On the 
following items, please indicate to what extent you agree with each statement: 
 
The media twisted his words into something different than what he really meant. 
 
Very strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Very strongly 
agree 
 
He didn’t really mean what he said. 
 
Very strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Very strongly 
agree 
 
What he said wasn’t really a “big deal.” 
 
Very strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Very strongly 
agree 
 
This politician should be kicked out of his political party. 
 
Very strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Very strongly 
agree 
 
Sometimes “science” gets things wrong. 
 
Very strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Very strongly 
agree 
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DEMOCRATIC CONDITON 
 
 
 
Now think about the statement you previously read from the Democratic Congressman.  On the 
following items, please indicate to what extent you agree with each statement: 
 
The media twisted his words into something different than what he really meant. 
 
Very strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Very strongly 
agree 
 
He didn’t really mean what he said. 
 
Very strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Very strongly 
agree 
 
What he said wasn’t really a “big deal.” 
 
Very strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Very strongly 
agree 
 
This politician should be kicked out of his political party. 
 
Very strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Very strongly 
agree 
 
Sometimes “science” gets things wrong. 
 
Very strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Very strongly 
agree 
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APPENDIX H 
 
THE IRMA SCALE 
1. If a woman is raped while she is drunk, she is at least somewhat responsible for 
letting things get out of control. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2.  Although most women wouldn’t admit it, they generally find being physically 
forced into sex a real ‘‘turn-on.’’ 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
3.  When men rape, it is because of their strong desire for sex. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
4. If a woman is willing to ‘‘make out’’ with a guy, then it’s no big deal if he goes a 
little further and has sex 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
5.  Women who are caught having an illicit affair sometimes claim that it was rape.
  
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
6.  Many so-called rape victims are actually women who had sex and ‘‘changed 
their minds’’ afterwards. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
7.  Many women secretly desire to be raped. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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8.  Rape mainly occurs on the ‘‘bad’’ side of town.  
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
9.  Usually, it is only women who do things like hang out in bars and sleep around 
that are raped. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
10.  If a woman doesn’t physically fight back, you can’t really say that it was rape. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
11.  Men from nice middle-class homes almost never rape. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
12.  Rape isn’t as big a problem as some feminists would like people to think. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
13.  When women go around wearing low-cut tops or short skirts, they’re just asking 
for trouble 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
14.  Rape accusations are often used as a way of getting back at men. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
15.  A rape probably didn’t happen if the woman has no bruises or marks. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
16.  Many women find being forced to have sex very arousing. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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17.  If a woman goes home with a man she doesn’t know, it is her own fault if she is 
raped. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
18.  Rapists are usually sexually frustrated individuals.  
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
19.  It is usually only women who dress suggestively that are raped. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
20.  Some women prefer to have sex forced on them so they don’t have to feel guilty 
about it. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
21.  If the rapist doesn’t have a weapon, you really can’t call it a rape. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
22.  When a woman is a sexual tease, eventually she is going to get into trouble. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
23.  Being raped isn’t as bad as being mugged and beaten. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
24.  Rape is unlikely to happen in the woman’s own familiar neighborhood. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
25.  In reality, women are almost never raped by their boyfriends.  
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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26.  Women tend to exaggerate how much rape affects them. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
27.  When a man is very sexually aroused, he may not even realize that the woman is 
resisting.  
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
28.  A lot of women lead a man on and then they cry rape. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
29.  A lot of times, women who claim they were raped just have emotional problems. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
30.  If a woman doesn’t physically resist sex—even when protesting verbally— it 
really can’t be considered rape. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
31.  Rape almost never happens in the woman’s own home. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
32.  A woman who ‘‘teases’’ men deserves anything that might happen. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
33.  When women are raped, it’s often because the way they said ‘‘no’’ was 
ambiguous.. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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34.  If a woman isn’t a virgin, then it shouldn’t be a big deal if her date forces her to 
have sex. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
35.  Men don’t usually intend to force sex on a woman, but sometimes they get too 
sexually carried away. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
36.  A woman who dresses in skimpy clothes should not be surprised if a man tries to 
force her to have sex. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
37.  Rape happens when a man’s sex drive gets out of control. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
38.  A woman who goes to the home or apartment of a man on the first date is 
implying that she wants to have sex. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
39.  Many women actually enjoy sex after the guy uses a little force. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
40.  If a woman claims to have been raped but has no bruises or scrapes, she probably 
shouldn’t be taken too seriously. 
Very 
strongly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
77 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1)  How old are you? (in years)  ________ 
2) Please indicate which of the following race categorizations you most closely identify with: 
____European American (White) ____African American (Black)    
____Asian American    ____Latino(a)  ____Native American 
      ____Other (write-in) ___________ 
3) Please indicate your average earnings per year.  If you are currently considered a dependent 
of your parent/guardian, indicate your parent/guardians average earnings per year. 
____ under $25,000    ____$25,000-50,000    ____$50,001-100,000 
____$100,001-250,000   ____$250,000+    ____Unsure/prefer not to answer 
4)  Which political party do you most closely affiliate with?  Please choose one of the two 
options below.  
____Democrat    ____Republican    
 
5) Using the scale below, please indicate how strongly you affiliate with the political party you 
chose above: 
Very     
Strongly 
Affiliated 
Strongly 
Affiliated 
Somewhat 
Affiliated 
Somewhat 
Affiliated 
Unaffiliated Very 
Unaffiliated 
 
 
6)  Are you registered to vote? 
____yes    ____no 
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APPENDIX J 
 
REPUBLICAN AFFILIATION STRENGTH 
VISUAL ANALOG 
 
Please choose the picture below that best describes how you currently view the relationship between you and 
your political party: 
_______  
_______  
_______  
_______  
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_______  
_______  
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DEMOCRATIC AFFILIATION STRENGTH 
VISUAL ANALOG 
Please choose the picture below that best describes how you currently view the relationship between you and 
your political party: 
_______  
_______  
_______  
_______  
_______  
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_______  
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APPENDIX K 
 
MEDIATION PROCESS FOR RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE 
 
Read about 
Outgroup  
Member 
Vote for Ingroup 
Member 
Less 
Trivialization of 
Issue  
Less 
Endorsement 
of Rape Myths 
Read about 
Ingroup 
Member 
Vote for Ingroup 
Member Trivialize Issue  
Endorse 
Rape Myths 
